

From WHOIS to WHOWAS:

A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy Under the GDPR

Chaoyi Lu, Baojun Liu, Yiming Zhang, Zhou Li, Fenglu Zhang, Haixin Duan, Ying Liu, Joann Qiongna Chen, Jinjin Liang, Zaifeng Zhang, Shuang Hao and Min Yang



Media Reports

Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe

Cybercrime Digest

Bi-weekly update and global outlook by the
Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe (C-PROC)

16 – 28 February 2021

Source: *Network and Distributed Systems Security (NDSS) Symposium 2021*

Date: 25 Feb 2021

From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy under the GDPR

"In this study, we report the first large-scale measurement study to answer these questions, in hopes of guiding the enforcement of the GDPR and identifying pitfalls during compliance. This study is made possible by analyzing a collection of 1.2 billion WHOIS records spanning two years. [...] Our findings of WHOIS GDPR compliance are multi-fold. To highlight a few, we discover that the GDPR has a profound impact on WHOIS, with over 85% surveyed large WHOIS providers redacting EEA records at scale. Surprisingly, over 60% large WHOIS data providers also redact non-EEA records. A variety of compliance flaws like incomplete redaction are also identified. The impact on security applications is prominent and redesign might be needed. We believe different communities (security, domain and legal) should work together to solve the issues for better WHOIS privacy and utility." [READ MORE](#)


CERT-SE (Computer Security Incident Response Team of Sweden)

The screenshot shows the top navigation bar of the CERT-SE website. On the left is the CERT-SE logo, which consists of the text 'CERT SE' with a yellow shield icon below the 'E'. To the right of the logo are navigation links: 'About CERT-SE', 'Sitemap', 'search', and 'To cookies'. Further right is the MSB logo (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap) and its full name in Swedish. Below the navigation bar, the page indicates the newsletter was published on 2021-02-26 at 16:59. The main heading is 'CERT-SE's weekly newsletter v.8'. The body text states: 'At the end of the shortest month of the year, here is a fairly long weekly letter. This week, many of the articles are about different attacks both in our immediate area and on other continents. There will of course be some ransomware, reports and other goodies.' It then says 'Have a nice weekend, CERT-SE!' and provides the title and URL of the featured article: 'From WHOIS to WHOWAS: A Large-Scale Measurement Study of Domain Registration Privacy under the GDPR' with the URL https://www.ndss-symposium.org/wp-content/uploads/ndss2021_2A-2_23134_paper.pdf.

When Systems Go Real-Name...

Defeats abusive acts effectively

Cellular networks



Transportation

车次	始发站	终到站	时长	商务	一等	二等
G11	北京南	上海虹桥	4小时33分钟	无	1张	1张
复兴号						
G155	北京南	上海虹桥	5小时56分钟	4张	有	有
复兴号						
G147	北京南	上海虹桥	6小时10分钟	4张	5张	有

Online activity

请拍摄**逸本人的二代身份证



根据法律法规要求, 为了避免影响你的余额支付等功能, 请尽快完善身份信息



Domain Registration Goes Real-Name, Too

Supported by ICANN and government regulations

Registrant
Name

请输入内容

域名持有者名称代表域名的拥有权，请填写与所有者证件完全一致的企业名称或姓名。
若该域名需备案，请确保域名持有者名称与备案主体名称一致，并完成域名实名认证。

Postal
Address &
Code

中国

请选择省份

请选择城市

请输入内容

请输入内容

Phone

86

手机号/区号+固定电话

分机号 (选填)

手机号码示例: 86 138XXXX1234 (分机号不填)
固定电话示例: 86 01095187XXX 4 (分机号选填)

Email

请输入内容

根据ICANN要求，域名持有人邮箱必须真实有效，
请您及时完成[邮箱验证](#)。

ID card & Passport verification



拖拽上传文
件或

查看本地文件

请上传清晰且包含完整边框，无遮挡、涂抹的证件图片。
格式支持JPG、JPEG、PNG、BMP、HEIC、WebP，大小55KB~5M
以内。


(Domain registration data required by AliYun)

WHOIS: Real-Name for Domain Registration

Personal data of domain holders are *collected*

Names, addresses, phone numbers and emails

Stored by registrars and registries (WHOIS *providers*)



WHOIS: Real-Name for Domain Registration

Personal data of domain holders are *published*

Query-based access via WHOIS protocol

Web-based interface / WHOIS server (TCP port 43)

WHOIS query is open and free to everyone

Domain Information

Name: ndss-symposium.org

Registry Domain ID: D402200000003323312-LROR

Nameservers:

aron.ns.cloudflare.com

yahir.ns.cloudflare.com

Registry Expiration: 2021-08-15 17:22:32 UTC

Updated: 2020-10-06 14:36:34 UTC

Created: 2017-08-15 17:22:32 UTC

Contact Information

Registrant:

Organization: Internet Society


Mailing Address: Virginia, United States

(Domain registration data of **ndss-symposium.org** acquired from lookup.icann.org on Jan 31, 2021)

Security Feeds on WHOIS, Heavily

Spam detection, domain takedown, vulnerability notification...

"Like other companies, Facebook uses Whois data in conjunction with our security technology and systems to help protect people from a range of abuse, spam, and other risks. For example, we have used Whois data and related DNS infrastructure to identify and take down tech support scams operated by spammers who make fraudulent use of domain names, phone numbers, and websites."



"Microsoft includes Whois data with our security intelligence insights to provide additional context in investigations and threat detections. This context helps us more quickly triage security issues and implement protections for Microsoft and our customers."

Sounds good, right?

Until...

General Data Protection Regulation

A high-level framework about protecting personal data

Personal data: information of identifying/identifiable natural person

Protects personal data processing (storage, disclosure, ...)



General Data Protection Regulation

A high-level framework about protecting personal data

Personal data: information of identifying/identifiable natural person

Protects personal data processing (storage, disclosure, ...)

Expanded territorial scope

Applies to processing of personal data of subjects in the EU

Regardless of where the processing takes place

Profound impact on Internet applications

Website cookies, online ads, privacy notices, ...



When WHOIS Meets GDPR

“WHOIS” becomes “WHOWAS”

Releasing personal data in WHOIS shall be consented

Guidelines published by ICANN on May 17, 2018

“*Temporary Specification for gTLD Registration Data**” (TempSpec)

Applies to all gTLD registries and registrars

Collection of registration data

Is maintained.

Personal data is still collected
at domain registration.

Access to registration data

Is restricted.

Tiered/layered access under
legitimate purposes.

* <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gtld-registration-data-temp-spec-17may18-en.pdf>

When WHOIS Meets GDPR

WHOIS publishing requirements of ICANN TempSpec

Replacing personal data with redacted/anonymized values
Providers decide the scope of data to be protected.

Registration Data Fields	Data Subjects	Data Publishing Requirements
Name, Street, City, Postal Code, Phone, Fax	Registrant, Admin, Tech	1) Provide a redacted value (“ <i>substantially similar</i> ” to “redacted for privacy”), or
Organization, State/Province, Country	Admin, Tech	2) Provide an empty value , or do not provide the fields
Email Address	Registrant, Admin, Tech	Provide an anonymized email address or web form enabling communication with data subject

* <https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/gtld-registration-data-temp-spec-17may18-en.pdf>

When WHOIS Meets GDPR

WHOIS publishing requirements of ICANN TempSpec

Replacing personal data with *redacted/anonymized* values
Providers decide the scope of data to be protected.

Registrant Contact
Name: lu chao yi
Organization: lu chao yi
Mailing Address: Le Jia
International No.999 Liang Mu
Road Yuhang District, Hangzhou
Zhejiang 311121 CN
Phone: +86.57185022088
Ext:
Fax: +86.57186562951
Fax Ext:
Email:mylcy. 1@163.com



Name: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
Organization: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
Street: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
City: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
State/Province: **Brussels**
Postal Code: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
Country: **BE**
Phone: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
Fax: **REDACTED FOR PRIVACY**
Email: <http://whois.contact-form.com/domain>

Not protected

Redacted

Research Questions

Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers

Are providers compliant to the TempSpec?

How do they redact WHOIS data?

Are there any compliance flaws?

What is the scope of protected domains?

Security Impact of WHOIS Data Loss

How many security works rely on WHOIS?

Do they use redacted WHOIS data?

What are the security systems used for?

How to remediate the loss of WHOIS?

Part I-A:

**Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers
(Methodology)**

Methodology: Overview

Data-driven measurement study

Latitudinal view: covering a wide range of WHOIS providers

Longitudinal view: covering dates before/after GDPR went effective

A. WHOIS data collection

2-year parsed WHOIS data

B. Compliance Analysis (*GCChecker*)

Identify protected/redacted records
and give compliance rankings



Methodology: WHOIS Data Collection

Challenge: WHOIS ecosystem is fragmented


Hundreds of providers maintain WHOIS servers

Format of WHOIS data is *inconsistent*

Solution: parsed historical WHOIS dataset from industrial partner

Collects WHOIS of domains observed in its passive DNS

Parsed by *manually-generated templates*



Methodology: WHOIS Data Collection

Overview of WHOIS dataset (Jan 2018 ~ Dec 2019)

12% EEA domains; 13% domains older than 10 years

Collected from port 43 of WHOIS servers (not from web WHOIS tools)

Year	Count of				Creation Date		Registrant Region	
	Record	Domain	Region	TLD	~ '09	'10 ~ '19	EEA	Non-EEA
2018	659M	211M	218	758	15.7%	84.3%	12.9%	87.1%
2019	583M	215M	218	754	14.5%	85.5%	12.4%	87.6%
All	1.24B	267M	219	783	13.4%	86.6%	12.2%	87.8%

Methodology: Compliance Analysis

Challenge: different wording/language for redaction

TempSpec do not enforce the use of “*redacted for privacy*”


Methodology: Compliance Analysis

Challenge: different wording/language for redaction


TempSpec do not enforce the use of “*redacted for privacy*”

Solution: unsupervised clustering of WHOIS record groups

Replace records at scale → High textual similarity → Clusters → Few Outliers



Not compliant, %outlier is high



Compliant, %outlier is low

Methodology: Compliance Analysis

Design of GCChecker

Grouping WHOIS records: (*provider, registrant_region, data_subject, week*)




Methodology: Compliance Analysis

Design of GCChecker

Grouping WHOIS records: (*provider, registrant_region, data_subject, week*)

Preprocessing: normalize values, extract TF-IDF features




Methodology: Compliance Analysis

Design of GCChecker

Grouping WHOIS records: (*provider, registrant_region, data_subject, week*)

Preprocessing: normalize values, extract TF-IDF features

Clustering: DBSCAN finds outliers, NER refines clusters



Methodology: Compliance Analysis


Design of GCChecker

Grouping WHOIS records: (*provider, registrant_region, data_subject, week*)

Preprocessing: normalize values, extract TF-IDF features

Clustering: DBSCAN finds outliers, NER refines clusters

Provider classification: rank from on weekly outlier ratios



Part I-B:

Data Publishing Changes of WHOIS Providers (Results of 143 large providers)

Scale of WHOIS Data Redaction

Over 85% large WHOIS providers are fully-compliant

Large: as of *EEA WHOIS records* collected

Registrars: 73 / 89 (total domain share > 54%)


Registries: 51 / 54

Flawed implementations

Missing protection of addresses

Only protecting email addresses

Others...



WHOIS compliance of EEA records from registrars
(corresponding with their domain share)

Timeline of WHOIS Data Redaction

Over 80% fully-compliant providers completed in time

100 / 124 completed before May 25, 2018

Timeline of WHOIS Data Redaction


Over 80% fully-compliant providers completed in time

100 / 124 completed before May 25, 2018

Prominent efforts were taken *after* TempSpec (May 17)

Providers lack specific guidelines, thus chose to wait

Only 1 week left for providers to take actions



Measures of WHOIS Data Redaction

Contact masking measures

TempSpec: Use redacted value / empty value / privacy protection services

Category	# Provider	Example provider and values
Redacted value	58	ID-69 Tucows Domains Inc. (<i>“Redacted for privacy”</i>)
		ID-2 Network Solutions, LLC (<i>“statutory masking enabled”</i>)
		ID-625 Name.com, Inc. (<i>“non-public data”</i>)
		ID-1505 Gransy, s.r.o. (<i>“not disclosed”</i>)
Empty value	63	ID-146 GoDaddy.com, LLC; Public Internet Registry (PIR)
Privacy protection	13	ID-1456 NetArt Registrar Sp. z o.o. (<i>whoisdataprotection.com</i>)

Measures of WHOIS Data Redaction

Email anonymization measures

TempSpec: Use web form / anonymized email that *facilitate communication*

Over 25% fully-compliant registrars *do not* offer such channel

Facilitates Communication	# Registrar	Interface	Example
Yes	42 (72%)	Web form	(https://www.godaddy.com/whois/results.aspx)
		Email	(f*****7@proxyregistrant.email)
No	21 (28%)	Web	(https://tieredaccess.com)
		Email	(abuse@web.com)

Scope of WHOIS Data Redaction

TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

Scope of WHOIS Data Redaction


TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

Most providers sanitize *all* WHOIS data → Bad news for researchers

At least 60% fully-compliant providers apply globally

Causing a *global, escalated loss* of WHOIS



Comparison of outlier ratio of EEA and non-EEA records 32

Scope of WHOIS Data Redaction

TempSpec lets providers decide what data to protect

Apply to EEA domains only / Apply in a global basis

Most providers sanitize *all* WHOIS data → Bad news for researchers

At least 60% fully-compliant providers apply globally

Causing a *global, escalated loss* of WHOIS

Reasons?

1 week time is short for complete plans

Hard to determine what data is under scope

Saves work to comply with future policies (e.g., CCPA)

Part II:

Security Impact of WHOIS Data Loss

WHOIS in Security Literature

Security papers published in 15 years of 5 conferences

NDSS, USENIX Security, IEEE S&P, ACM CCS, ACM IMC (2005 ~ 2020)

Download all via custom crawler



The screenshot shows the NDSS Symposium 2020 Programme page. Two paper entries are highlighted with orange boxes and arrows pointing to a central text 'Extract links to papers'. The first entry is 'FUSE: Finding File Upload Bugs via Penetration Testing' by Taekjin Lee, Seongil Wi, Suyoung Lee, and Soeul Son. The second entry is 'Melting Pot of Origins: Compromising the Intermediary Web Services that Rehost Websites' by Takuya Watanabe, Eitaro Shioji, Mitsuaki Akiyama, Tatsuya Mori, NICT, and RIKEN AIP. Each entry has buttons for 'Abstract', 'Paper', 'Slides', and 'Video'.

<https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-program/2020-program/>



Paper database
(4,304 paper PDFs)

Search keywords
(e.g., WHOIS, Domain)

Manual confirmation




51 papers using
WHOIS data

WHOIS in Security Literature

69% works that use WHOIS rely on redacted data

31 papers covering a wide range of security topics



Classified by security topics


WHOIS Usage	Paper examples
Infer domain ownership / measurement purposes	Halvorson15, Vissers15, Chen16, Liu17
Features for detection	Sivakorn19, Le Pochat20
Vulnerability notification	Stock16, Stock18, Roth20
Result validation	Paxson13, Van Ede20, Delignat-Lavaud14,

WHOIS in Security Literature

69% works that use WHOIS rely on redacted data

31 papers covering a wide range of security topics

Registrant contact and email addresses are frequently used



Registrant contact: 29 papers (83%)

Admin/Tech contact: 15 papers (43%)

Email addresses: 26 papers (74%)

Classified by WHOIS fields

WHOIS in Security Literature

69% works that use WHOIS rely on redacted data

31 papers covering a wide range of security topics

Registrant contact and *email addresses* are frequently used

Other works not affected by WHOIS redaction

Use WHOIS fields that are not personal data

Creation date, Registrar info, Nameserver IP...

WHOIS in Security Literature


Hurdles for security researchers to access WHOIS

Over 70% WHOIS requests from security researchers are rejected*
Current tiered systems lack instructions

Remediation: a better format of tiered access / data redaction

Use RDAP protocol to control access
Use Fuzzy hashing to replace fixed values
Review and adjust current security systems

TIERED ACCESS



Sign In

Username

Password

I accept the Tiered Access [Terms of Service](#)

SIGN IN

[Forgot Password](#)

What is Tiered Access?

allows accredited, authenticated users with a legitimate interest to look up registration data (Whois info) for

How is access granted?

ensure that only those with legitimate purposes, including law enforcement, intellectual property, and commercial

(Tiered access system of a registrar)

* https://docs.apwg.org/reports/ICANN_GDPR_WHOIS_Users_Survey_20181018.pdf

Part III:

Discussion & Summary

Discussion

GDPR's impact on WHOIS is substantial

Most WHOIS providers *actively* and *extensively* redact personal data

A number of security works are affected due to WHOIS loss

Lessons learnt: Enforcing privacy policies is still a complex task

TempSpec leaves flexibility for providers, but not enough time

Checking tools are helpful to identify implementation flaws

The task requires more efficient collaboration across communities

Recommendations

Recommendations to multiple stakeholders

Party	Recommendation
Tech and legal authorities	Allow more lead time for more efficient discussions
Internet Supervisors (e.g. ICANN)	Develop more specific guidelines to avoid confusion
WHOIS providers	Review data protection implementations
Security researchers	Review and adjust security systems that rely on WHOIS

Search Engine for Security Papers

Search published security papers by keywords

Location: <https://secpaper.cn/about>

Conferences: IEEE S&P, USENIX Security, CCS, NDSS, IMC, DSN, RAID...

Trials and suggestions are welcome!

Credited to:

Fenglu Zhang @

Tsinghua

zfl20@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn

The screenshot shows a search engine interface with the following fields and options:

- 主关键词 (必填)**: 论文中必须出现的关键词, 例如: 'DNS'; 正则匹配多个关键词, 例如: 'DNS|IPv6|HTTPS?'
- 主关键词下限**: 主关键词至少出现的次数, 减少无关论文数量
- 副关键词**: 可选关键词, 在结果中显示, 例子: 查询CDN相关的论文, 又关注其中HTTPS和PKI相关文章: 将副关键词设为'HTTPS|PKI', 主关键词设为'CDN'
- 匹配选项**:
 - 匹配无视大小写
 - 全文匹配
 - 仅匹配标题
 - 仅匹配作者
- 最早年份**: 例如2020, 检索范围[最早时间, 最晚时间]
- 最晚年份**: 例如2020, 检索范围[最早时间, 最晚时间]
- 会议选择**:
 - S&P
 - USENIX
 - CCS
 - NDSS
 - IMC
 - DSN
 - RAID
 - ASIA CCS
 - ANRW
 - 全选
- 查询** (按钮)

Summary

GDPR's impact is profound on WHOIS

Large WHOIS providers *actively* and *extensively* redact WHOIS data

Implementation flaws need to be fixed

The *excessive data protection scope* causes global WHOIS loss

A wide range of security works need review or adjustment

Redacted WHOIS data is widely used by security literature

Lessons learnt

Multiple stakeholders need more efficient collaboration

Release compliance checking tool

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