
### Cracking the Wall of Confinement: Understanding and Analyzing Malicious Domain Take-downs

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## Overview


- What is a domain take-down?
- Violation includes:
  - o malware distribution,
  - o pharmaceutical trading,
  - Copyright infringement, etc.
- Goal: mainly to disrupt the malicious traffic
  - o Show warning banner
  - Notify infected hosts
  - Mimic the operation of a command and control center (C&C)
- Little information is available about the taken-down operation and their effectiveness

### **Research Goals**

- 1. Understanding the take-down process
- 2. Assessing the **security** and **reliability** of the take-down process
- 3. Set some **recommendation** for a more effective take-down operation


## How are Domains Taken Down?

- 1. Administrative Aspects (Request):
  - File an <u>Acceptable Use Policy</u> (AUP) complaint
  - Obtain a court order
- 2. Technical Aspects (Execution):
  - Sinkholing: Change DNS configuration (resolvable)
  - **Delisting:** Change registration status (unresolvable)
  - Set the domains as "Reserved" (rare, out of scope)




# Take-down: (Delisting)


- Domain is **not resolvable**: NXDOMAIN
- <u>Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) status code in Whois record</u> determines a domain's **registration status**
- Status codes: **serverHold**, and **clientHold** remove the domain from the DNS
- Note: These status codes are **NOT** exclusively used in take-down operations




## Approach




### Analysis of Take-down Operations (Distribution)



#### Analysis of Take-down Operations (Sinkhole Duration)





By Sinkhole Operator

# Findings

- Domain availability after release:
  - o 56.46%,
  - o 14% in less than 10 months
- Some malicious domains have been **maliciously re-registered** again after being released
- We were able to **hijack a taken-down domain** due to a DNS misconfiguration
- **Expired nameservers** purchased by new owners cause the traffic of around 30K domains to be redirected to new owners

#### Findings: (Hijacking a taken-down domain)

- carders.org was initially taken-down by the FBI
- FBI utilized Amazon Route 53

	in zone: 2012-06-27 n zone: 2018-07-22
rrtype:	NS
rdata:	ns-9.awsdns-01.com.
	ns-922.awsdns-51.net.
	ns-1168.awsdns-18.org.
	ns-1876.awsdns-42.co.uk.
first seen:	2012-06-26
last seen:	2013-01-05
rrtype:	A
rdata:	204.236.228.238

carders.org.	NS NS NS	ns-1601.awsdns-08.co.uk. ns-1168.awsdns-18.org. ns-762.awsdns-31.net. ns-226.awsdns-28.com.
www.carders.org.	A	8.188.96.3
carders.org.	A	ALIAS www.carders.org.

The PDNS records for carders.org (NS and A). The NS record was still set at .org TLD "dangling NS"

Our takeover of carders.org exploiting the dangling NS record and setting a new A record. The set IP address points to our webserver

### Findings: (Expired Nameservers)

- Sinkholes operated by Conficker Working Group: ns.cwgsh.{com,net,org}
- Domains cwgsh.{com,net,org} expired on Feb. 2011

zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.com.
zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.net.
zzyiwabmkz.info.	NS	ns.cwgsh.org.
www.zzyiwabmkz.info.	A	190.2.131.62
ww9.zzyiwabmkz.info.	A	166.78.101.108

A record sets for new subdomains of zzyiwabmkz.info observed in July 2018. After expiration of cwgsh.{com,net,org}

## Conclusion

We recommend setting specific policies regulating take-down procedures

- O Checking DNS configurations
- O Take-down duration and release process:
  - a. Malware distribution: must remain taken down until no more traffic is received
  - b. Other illicit activity:
    - i. Domain's popularity
    - ii. Domain's current traffic
    - iii. Type of illicit activity

Thank you Questions?