




Resident Evil: Understanding Residential IP Proxy as a Dark Service

Xianghang Mi, Xuan Feng, Xiaojing Liao
 Baojun Liu, XiaoFeng Wang, Feng Qian
 Zhou Li, Sumayah Alrwais, Limin Sun, Ying Liu



Background: Web Proxies



**HTTP/HTTPS
/SOCKS**



**Exit nodes
are constrained**




**Exit nodes
are distinguishable**




**Exit nodes
may be heavily abused**

Service blocking or degradation


Background: Residential IP Proxy as a Service



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
**Millions of
Residential IPs**



**Clean IPs,
Never Get Blocked**



**Globally
Distributed**



**No
Traffic Limits**

Outline

Service
Overview

Network Structure & Scale & Distribution

Residential
or Not

Are proxy peers
authentically residential IP addresses?

Evasiveness

How well can proxy peers evade traffic detection or blocking?

Recruitment

How can millions of proxy peers get recruited?


Usage

What are those proxies used for, in the real world?


Misc. Findings

Collusion, Local traffic, etc.

Service Overview: How it works



Service Overview: How it works



- ★ Back-connect proxy model, proxy peers are hidden from customers
- ★ HTTP/HTTPS/SOCKS
- ★ Multiple rotating strategies: sticky & non-sticky
- ★ Allow customers to customize location of proxy peers

Service Overview: Scale



Each request is identified by a unique subdomain



Each request/response has payload encrypted and signed

Provider	Price	Payment	Infiltration Period
Proxies Online	\$25/GB	Paypal	07/06/2017 - 11/24/2017
Geosurf	\$300/month	Paypal	09/17/2017 - 10/22/2017
ProxyRack	\$40/month	Bitcoin	09/18/2017 - 11/24/2017
Luminati	\$500/month	Paypal	09/25/2017 - 11/01/2017
IAPS Security	\$500/month	Bitcoin	09/23/2017 - 11/01/2017

Service Overview: Scale



Each request is identified by a unique subdomain



Each request/response has payload encrypted and signed

60+ millions of successful probes


6.2 millions of unique IPv4 addresses

238 countries/regions, 52K+ ISPs.

Service Overview: Distribution




4096 * 4096 bitmap




**Each /24 IPv4 prefix is mapped to a pixel,
using Hilbert curve of order 12**

**Different pixel colors denote
of proxy IPs for a given /24 prefix**

Service Overview: Distribution



Residential or Not




★ GT sources of various noise levels

★ Clean GT for training, noisy for evaluation

Source	Label	# IPs	# /16	# /8	# Training
Manual	resi-clean	79	25	19	79
Device Search Engine	resi-clean	89,345	13,525	195	9,921
Trace My IP	resi-noisy	37,480	11,402	213	0
Filtered IP Whois	resi-noisy	23,264,961	394	31	0
IoT Botnets	resi-noisy	1,699,291	20,112	200	0
Public Clouds	non-resi-clean	53,716,321	968	99	5,000
Alexa Top1M	non-resi-clean	442,989	14,365	213	4,481
Commercial Proxies	non-resi-clean	519	71	44	519
Public Proxies	non-resi-noisy	148,509	14,004	204	0


Residential or Not




Residential IPs/prefixes are usually web clients instead of servers




Residential IPs/prefixes tend to be directly managed by ISPs



DNS Records & Historical IP Whois




Capture web activities



Capture network hierarchy





Capture evolution by time




35 features

For example, number of TLD+3 domains mapped to the parent /24 IP prefix

Residential or Not



Residential or Not



5.9M (95.22%) of 6.2M predicted as residential IPs

Evasiveness


Recognized as
proxy?

Identified as
malicious?

Evasiveness

Recognized as proxy?

Identified as malicious?



Publicly available proxy dataset

- ★ Tor relays
- ★ Free web proxies
- ★ IP2Proxy LITE




Only 0.06% of 6.2M IPs

Evasiveness

Recognized as proxy?

Identified as malicious?



Publicly available IP threats


- ★ Botnet bots
- ★ Spamhaus EDROP
- ★ Open Threat Exchanges



Only 2.20% of 6.2M IPs


Recruitment

Identify legitimate
recruitment programs




Are those proxy peers voluntary users?

IP Profiling



Any IoT devices?

Identify
proxy programs



What programs are used to proxy traffic?

Recruitment

Identify legitimate
recruitment programs

IP Profiling

Identify
proxy programs

**Only Luminati was found to recruit
users through Hola programs**


**And Hola programs were reported
as problematic in previous studies**

Recruitment

Identify legitimate recruitment programs

IP Profiling

Identify proxy programs

 730K IPs responded to our banner grabbing

 550K got device type identified


 All providers got suspicious IoT devices identified for their proxy IPs, including Luminati

Device Type	Num	(%)
router	114,768	48.42
firewall	25,088	10.58
WAP	24,470	10.32
gateway	22,003	9.28
broadband	17,358	7.32
webcam	13,024	5.49
security-misc	10,608	4.48
DVR	4,249	1.79
media device	2,589	1.09
storage-misc	1,988	0.84

Device Vendor	Num	(%)
MikroTik	86,593	36.53
Huawei	37,545	15.84
BusyBox	18,337	7.74
Technicolor	16,866	7.12
SonicWall	14,122	5.96
Fortinet	9,190	3.88
Dahua	6,258	2.64
ZyXEL	5,601	2.36
AVM	5,272	2.22
Cyberoam	4,558	1.92

Recruitment

Identify legitimate recruitment programs



IP Profiling

★ 67 PUP samples identified


★ Proxy programs are found for all 5 providers

Identify proxy programs

★ 50 of them were flagged by anti-virus engines

Usage


- ★ For the 67 proxy programs, **5M traffic logs** were sampled to study usage
- ★ 9.36% of the destinations were reported to be malicious by VirusTotal



ntkrnlpa.cn,
gwf-bd.com,
fadergolf.com,
www.2345jiasu.com,
www.pf11.com,


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- ★ Top 1000 traffic destinations were manually studied.




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
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
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
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
Misc. Findings

Connection between proxy providers

	Proxies Online	Geosurf	IAPS Security	Luminati	ProxyRack
Proxies Online		12.5%	0%	0.06%	0.09%
Geosurf	36.3%		0%	0.23%	1.7%
IAPS Security	0%	0%		66%	0.07%
Luminati	0.02%	0.02%	0.07%		0.04%
ProxyRack	0.14%	0.86%	0%	0.2%	

Risk to the local network

Long-tailed distribution



Proxies Online and Geosurf are the same proxy provider




IAPS Security is some kind of reseller for Luminati

Misc. Findings

Connection between proxy providers


Risk to the local network

Long-tailed distribution



3 out of 5 providers allow local traffic

Our Client Proxy Gateway Proxy Peer Our Web server



Misc. Findings

Connection between proxy providers

Risk to the local network


Long-tailed distribution

Provider	Top Countries (%)		Top ASNs (%)	
Proxies Online	Indian	32.2	9829	8.1
	USA	7.8	8151	5.4
	Mexico	6.7	24560	4.9
Geosurf	India	27.9	8151	7.2
	Brazil	9.2	9829	5.8
	Mexico	9.1	55836	4.5
ProxyRack	Russia	8.6	1797	5.3
	Indonesia	8.1	8452	4.7
	Egypt	6.3	45595	4.0
Luminati	Turkey	12.7	9121	8.5
	Ukraine	7.9	25019	1.8
	UK	6.1	34984	1.8

Summary



**Millions of residential IPs
with high evasiveness**



**A prosperous ecosystem with higher
prices and more service providers**




**Potential threats to
local network environments**



**Problematic recruitment: a mix of
legitimate and suspicious channels**



**Powerful infrastructure for
online abuse activities**



**Promising and stealthy monetization
channels for compromised devices**

A lie that is half-truth is the darkest of all lies.

—Alfred Tennyson

Q&A

xmi@iu.edu

Data & Code: <https://rpaas.site>